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The existence of the oath in the courtroom can be traced back thousands of 
years throughout history, but the use, meaning, and effect of the oath in law has 
changed dramatically. The oath as we know it was once a powerful truth-telling 
instrument that our ancestors used to call upon a higher power. It was the belief of 
many that the oath itself was not sworn to man or state, but rather directly to a deity.  
 The oath has since then evolved as a result of ever changing beliefs, fueled by 
increasing tolerance, shaping the oath into more of a tradition, and less of an edict. For 
centuries, theorists have attempted to determine whether an oath in court is actually 
effective at accomplishing its goal. 
 The intent of this thesis is to examine the origin of the oath all the way up to the 
present day. It will be through a comprehensive study of federal law, state law, case 
law, articles, and publications that we will better understand the oath as a truth-telling 
instrument that in recent times has lost its effect.  
From there, it will be possible to better form a solution to a problem that plagues 
our courtrooms: perjury, or the act of lying under oath. This thesis will seek to establish 
the best way for our community to actively work towards ensuring the integrity and 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
“It would seem, therefore, that this constitutional safeguard may no longer serve its 
original purpose, especially when, as we learned last year, some acts of perjury may 
now be acceptable - in this world, at least, if not the next.”  
James L. Buckley1 
 
The manner in which perjury is treated, as shown in this James L. Buckley quote, 






Forcing a witness to testify truthfully in court can be a difficult endeavor and 
knowing whether or not a witness is lying may be impossible to determine as there is 
little evidence to suggest that the courts could ever know with certainty whether 
testimony is true or not.2 Therefore, this examination shall deal solely with what can be 
known in relation to the oath in the courtroom. 
It shall be the goal of this paper, in part, to determine whether the blending of 
religious principles with the establishment of the American Common Law system has 
had a discernible effect on the level to which truth is elicited. More specifically, the 
question is whether the oath or affirmation requirement, in light of its known theological 
                                               
1
 Author: James L. Buckley is a retired judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The 
constitutional safeguard he speaks of here is the oath in court. 
2




history3, has proven to be effective. This could be considered the “oath experiment” and 
in those terms, this study shall conclude that the experiment is a near total failure today. 
It is the desire of this study to propose a solution that can work alongside the 
procedures already in place in the Florida Rules of Evidence, so as to ensure a more 
accurate system of evaluating testimony for truthfulness. In doing so, this study will first 
seek to understand the theological and ancient history of the oath, the secular direction 
the oath has taken, and the ultimate effectiveness of today’s oath. 
It is first necessary to examine the history of swearing under oath, as a thorough 
understanding of where the oath has come from coupled with an examination of its 
evolution, will serve to set our foundation. Special attention shall be given to the 
theological roots of the oath. 
Next, a modern day analysis of the oath in American Courts shall be endeavored. 
Specifically, this paper will look at the oath as it appears in the Florida Rules of 
Evidence, and it will also look into the role of juries as fact finders. It has been stated 
that the jury is the only true and reliable “lie detector”4 and this “lie detector” theory will 
be challenged with respect to what types of instructions the average Florida jury 




                                               
3
 By and through the use of the phrase “theological history”, this author intends to draw attention to the fear of divine 
retribution as encouragement to tell the truth under oath. 
4





At this point, the issue becomes clear: “Is the ‘oath or affirmation’ requirement in 
the Florida Rules of Evidence an effective means of ensuring that only the most reliable 
and truthful testimony is elicited in court?” The issue hinges on a particular assessment 
of what is considered effective, reliable and truthful. 
Truthful testimony, based on theological and religious belief systems, will serve 
to set the stage for this examination. Judeo-Christian beliefs in particular, will be 
examined since they provide the fundamental theological basis for the Florida Rules of 
Evidence.5 This becomes important in determining what our courts and legislatures say 
about the role of religion at trial. It becomes vital here to look at alternative means of 
eliciting truth, regardless of ethical compromise or public controversy. 
It will be this exhaustive approach that will yield the recommendation this study 
seeks. It is necessary to establish a tightly worded, powerful and effective jury 
instruction that will impress in the mind of jurors that testimony in court is properly 
consigned to their discretion, based upon their collective knowledge, individual 






                                               
5
 Sir W. Churchill, The Island Race, Corgi, London, 1964, 219 as reprinted in Rev. Prof. Dr. F.N. Lee, King Alfred The 
Great and Our Common Law (Dept. of Church History, Queensland Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Brisbane, 
Australia 2005) (2000). 
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CHAPTER TWO: ANCIENT HISTORY 
 
Any historical analysis of the oath or perjury in legal proceedings is going to be 
fragmented. The consensus appears to be that the oath (as society knows it today) is 
the product of many centuries of evolution.6 In fact, it wasn’t until the mid-16th century 
that any type of criminal violation for lying under oath can even be reliably traced.7 
However, throughout history, the oath in court appears a number of times carrying with 
it a considerable amount of reverence and importance. 
 
 
Origin of the Oath 
 
“It is not the oath that makes us believe the man, but the man the oath.” 
Aeschylus8 
 
The oath in legal proceedings extends back thousands of years and will prove to 





This study can begin nowhere else than with the Code of Hammurabi. This 
groundbreaking listing of ancient Babylonian laws survives as the one of the oldest 
deciphered writings of significant length in the world.9 
                                               
6
 Michael D. Gordon, The Perjury Statute of 1563: A Case History of Confusion 440 (Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 1980) (1980). 
7
 Michael D. Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the Elizabethan Courts (The American 
Journal of Legal History 1980) (1980). 
8
 Greek writer commonly credited with being The Father of the Greek Tragedy. 
9
 J. Dyneley Prince, The Code of Hammurabi 601 (The American Journal of Theology, The University of Chicago 
Press 1904) (1904). 
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Written under the rule of the sixth King of Babylon, Hammurabi, the Code of 
Hammurabi outlines legal principles that governed Babylon during (and after) the time 
that Hammurabi ruled. Its significance extends to how matters of false accusation, false 
witness, and immoral acts were dealt with almost 4,000 years ago.10 
The Code levies serious punishment upon those who accuse persons falsely. It 
enumerates that, “[t]o bring another into danger of death by false accusation” was a 
crime itself punishable by death.11 “To cause loss of liberty or property by false witness 
was punished by the penalty the perjurer sought to bring upon another.”12 Here the 
equal distribution of the law in Babylon is clear: if you cost another person his hand by 
false witness, you will lose your hand, if you cost another person his life by false 
witness, you will lose your life. This very ancient “eye-for-an-eye” style of legal 
application, also referred to as “lex talionis”13, was a hallmark of the era. So too was it a 
means to a very operative end: solemn and effective oaths. 
Lex talionis placed considerable emphasis on the necessity of truth telling, 
especially in matters of life, liberty and property. These rights appear more recently and 
exactly in the Constitution of the United States.14 Even in ancient times, these rights 
were viewed as being so sacred that if deprived by a false witness, they were just as 
                                               
10
 Claude Hermann Walter Johns, Babylonian Law – The Code of Hammurabi, 11 Encyclopedia Britannica (1910) 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hammpre.asp. 
11
 Id. at 5. 
12
 Id. at 5. 
13
 http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Lex_talionis (follow: no hyperlink). (“Latin for "law of retaliation", Lex 
Talionis is the principle of retributive justice expressed in the phrase "an eye for an eye," (Hebrew: עין תחת עין ) from 
Exodus 21:23–27. The basis of this form of law is the principle of proportionate punishment, often expressed under 
the motto "[l]et the punishment fit the crime’.”). 
14
 U.S. Const. amend. V, § 1. 
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swiftly taken from the offender.15 Here, punishment sought to serve as motivation for 
truthful testimony. 
The Code goes on to establish the foundation for the oath, “[p]arties and 
witnesses were put on oath. The penalty for false witness was usually that which would 
have been awarded the convicted criminal.”16 Here the identifiable violation of perjury is 
replaced with act of bearing “false witness”, something that will resurface in Biblical 
times. However, it will later become clear that not until the Perjury Statute of 1563 is an 
identifiable17 crime of perjury in existence.18 The Code of Hammurabi lays considerable 
foundation, in the form of tradition, to this end.19 
In what appears to be a stark inconsistency with this very real punishment for 
lying, the Code enlists a “higher” form of punishment, in what appears to be a catchall 
way of impressing the seriousness of lying under oath upon all those who testify against 
another. This impression of a higher power comes, in part, from the depiction of a god 
giving Hammurabi the Code atop the steel on which it is written. The Code calls upon 
that higher power in the following way: “[f]inally, it may be noted that many immoral acts, 
such as the use of false weights, lying, &c. [sic.], which could not be brought into court, 
are severely denounced in the Omen Tablets as likely to bring the offender into ‘the 
hand of God’ as opposed to ‘the hand of the king’.”20 
                                               
15
 Johns, supra, at 5. 
16
 Id. at 6. 
17
 Author: read as “codified”. 
18
 Michael D. Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Perjury and the Elizabethan Courts, (The American 
Journal of Legal History 1980) (1980). 
19
 The “end” mentioned here is the author referring to the establishment of oaths in judicial proceedings. 
20
 Johns, supra, at 6 (author’s note). 
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It appears that the threat of death coupled with the threat of retribution was the 
two prong punishment that the Babylonians relied upon in minimizing false statements 
in matters of law. All accounts tend to show that witnesses were aware of this. While no 
concrete evidence seems to exist in support of the effectiveness of this approach, this 




Moving forward nearly one thousand years, a Biblical approach to truth telling 
can be found. Of the eighty-seven times the word “false” appears in the Bible, few have 
inspired such rich use than that which appears in the sixth chapter of Proverbs.22 What 
has been identified as the “Seven Deadly Sins” by some, lists the offense of lying twice: 
“[t]hese six things doth the LORD hate: yea, seven are an abomination unto him: a 
proud look, a lying tongue, and hands that shed innocent blood, an heart that deviseth 
wicked imaginations, feet that be swift in running to mischief, A false witness that 
speaketh lies, and he that soweth discord among brethren.”23 
Deuteronomy goes on to provide a legally reminiscent form of seeking truth. It 
states, “[t]hou dost not take up the Name of Jehovah thy God for a vain thing, for 
Jehovah doth not acquit him who taketh up His Name for a vain thing.”24 It is by this 
binding admonition that the Bible establishes the eternal sin that is false swearing. Not 
                                               
21
 Michael D. Gordon, The Perjury Statute of 1563: A Case History of Confusion, 438 (Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 1980) (1980).  
22
 Proverbs 6:19 (King James). 
23
 Proverbs 6:16-19 (King James) (emphasis added). 
24
 Deuteronomy 5:11 (Young’s Literal Translation). 
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only does one who swears wrongfully endure the possible pain of physical punishment, 
so too might this person suffer eternal punishment.  
Cross over between religious belief and legal truth telling is further established in 
Deuteronomy: “Thou shalt fear the LORD thy God, and serve him, and shalt swear by 
his name.”25 Swearing by the name of God helps to blend physical testimony with that 
which is held most sacred to many: the name of the Lord. The book of Jeremiah goes 
on to further develop this crossover: “And thou shalt swear, The LORD liveth, in truth, in 
judgment, and in righteousness; and the nations shall bless themselves in him, and in 
him shall they glory.”26 Here, the Bible establishes not only that the Lord oversees the 
truth of a witness, but also that the Lord himself lives in truth and in judgment.  
This basis, once understood, sheds considerable light on where truth telling 
comes to a head: “[f]or men verily swear by the greater: and an oath for confirmation is 
to them an end of all strife. Wherein God, willing more abundantly to shew unto the 
heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath…”27 In an 
ancient text on the Third Commandment, its anonymous author examines this same 
verse from Hebrews. Of it he says, “… because [God] could Swear by no greater, [H]e 
Swore by [H]imself.”28 Here God makes a promise by Himself, and in doing so, He 
cements His promise to man. 
 
                                               
25
 Deuteronomy 6:13 (King James). 
26
 Jeremiah 4:2 (King James). 
27
 Hebrews 6:16,17 (King James). 
28
 Anon, The Third Commandment; an essay tending to prove that perjury deserves not only the pillory but a much 
severer punishment, occasioned by a reflection on the heinious [sic] sin and extream [sic] mischiefs of perjury and the 
great confusion into which this kingdom and Church of England have lately been brought by false oathes [sic]. 7 






Close in time to these writings, the case against Leocrates helps to showcase 
how the Greek’s viewed the role of testimony. In this case, famed orator Lycurgus gave 
an opening statement. In this role, he sought to impress upon the witnesses and the jury 
the importance of truthful testimony. He states, “[a]sk the witnesses therefore to come 
up without hesitation and not to put offered favors before your interests and the state. 
Ask them to pay their country the debt of truth and justice which they owe and not to 
follow the example of Leocrates by failing in this duty. Otherwise let them swear the 
oath of disclaimer with their hands on the sacrifice.”29 Here Lycurgus equates the 
responsibility to tell the truth to a debt owed to the state.  
At this point in Lycurgus’ statement, it seems that the traditional calling to “truth 
for the Lord’s sake”30 is set aside for a form of compelling state interest. Lycurgus 
speaks to the citizen in his jury. Ignoring the obvious religious undertones that 
traditionally might have been called upon in a case of truthfulness; he spoke of a debt to 
truth and justice before succumbing to the calling of a higher power. 
He continues, “[t]he power which keeps our democracy together is the oath. For 
there are three things of which the state is built up: the archon, the juryman and the 
private citizen. Each of these gives this oath as a pledge, and rightly so. For human 
beings have often been deceived. Many criminals evade them, escaping the dangers of 
the moment, yes, and even remaining unpunished for these crimes for the remainder of 
their lives. But the gods no one who broke his oath would deceive. No one would 
                                               
29
 J.O. Burtt & Kenneth John Maidment, Minor Attic orators (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1941) (1982). 
30
 Author’s quotations. 
10 
 
escape their vengeance. If the perjured man does not suffer himself, at least his 
children and all his family are overtaken by dire misfortunes.”31  
Here Lycurgus gives up to the “gods” the ability to punish those who perjure 
themselves. To those who wish to bear false witness, he threatens the fate of their 
children and their family. This familial style of punishment resurfaces in additional 
Greco-Roman writings. 
Greek tradition goes on to highlight the gravity of the oath in “The Story of the 
Child of Oath”.32 This story serves to put into perspective how seriously oath taking was 
once regarded. Additionally, it shows that there was not only an obligation to God and 
State, but also to family. A historical review reveals that “... oaths played an important 
function in sanctioning and preserving agreements between private individuals, between 
the individual and the city, and between cities.”33 
Based on this belief, it becomes evident that, “[t]he swearing of an oath … 
involved the gods as witnesses, and made the parties to an oath liable to punishment by 
the gods if the oath were broken.”34 In addition, oaths were seen as binding obligations 
“…protected by the gods…” in the same writings.35 
The Story of the Child of Oath goes on to explain that “[t]he worst punishment a 
man could face was considered to be the loss of family, children, and descendants. A 
man who died without children would not be remembered in family cult; his family … 




 Michael Grant & Rachel Kitzinger, Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean 891 (Grant & Kitzinger ed., New York: 
Scribner’s 1988) (1980). 
33







and his ancestral gods would die with him… [f]urther, he would have failed his duty as a 
citizen because in the city’s eyes the purpose of having children was to preserve and to 
protect the fatherland and the altars of the gods.”36 
This punishment was grave once its extent was described: “the punishment for 
those who do not remain true to oaths sworn; they would be pursued by the unnamed 
child of Oath, a monster with no hands and no feet, who would destroy the family and 
the whole family line.”37 Imagine the seriousness with which oaths would have been 




A principal element of Roman law was developed and displayed around the year 
449 B.C. in the form of the Twelve Tables. Erected in the town center for all to see, 
these fundamental rules of law served to not only provide citizens with notice of their 
crimes, but also with their potential punishments. One such punishment resulted from 
bearing false witness, “[a] person who had been found guilty of giving false witness shall 
be hurled down from the Tarpeian Rock.”38 This author was hard-pressed to find a more 
direct crime-and-punishment system that has ever existed. Under Roman rule, a person 






                                               
36
 Id. at 891. 
37
 Id. at 891. 
38
 Paul Halsall, The Library of Original Sources: The Twelve Tables, c. 450 BCE (Oliver J. Thatcher ed., Milwaukee: 





Moving forward to the tenth century, the origins of what is now known as 
Common Law began to take shape. Compiled under King Alfred the Great, the Doom 
Book is a collection of state laws from three different Christian Saxon kingdoms: Kent, 
Mercia and Wessex.39 Coupled with these state laws were the principles of Mosaic Law, 
Celto-Brythonic Law, and Christian and Germanic customs. The end result was a legal 
structure that eventually became the underpinnings of modern American Law: the 
Common Law System.40 
The section of the Doom Book that speaks of those giving false witness 
originated from the Laws of Alfred, Guthrum and Edward the Elder. It states, “[i]f witches 
or diviners, perjurers or morth-workers... be found anywhere within the land; let them be 
driven from the country, and the people cleansed, or let them totally perish within the 
country...”41 A very clear point is made: those who lie under oath are in the same 
category as witches, diviners and morth-workers42. Being included in the same law 
speaks volumes as to how perjurers were classified at the time. 
The Doom Book was unique in relation to other historic texts that discuss the 
oath, in that; it provides one of the earliest scripts for taking an oath. For the accused, 
the script provided: “The other's oath that he is guiltless[:] By the Lord, I am guiltless, 
both in deed and counsel, and of the charge of which [the accuser’s name] accuses 
                                               
39
 Rev. Prof. Dr. F.N. Lee, King Alfred The Great and Our Common Law 1 (Rev. Prof. Dr. F.N. Lee ed., Dept. of 
Church History, Queensland Presbyterian Theological Seminary, Brisbane, Australia 2005) (2000). 
40
 Id. at 1. 
41
 Paul Halsall, The Library of Original Sources: The Anglo-Saxon Dooms, 560 – 975 (Oliver J. Thatcher ed., 
Milwaukee: University Research Extension Co., 1998) (1901), available at 
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/560-975dooms.asp. 
42
 He who causes death; a murderer. 
13 
 
me.”43 This script allowed the oath-taker to swear to his accuser that what he was about 
to testify to was, indeed, the truth. 
For he who was similarly charged, the script outlined: “His companion's oath who 
stands with him[:] [b]y the Lord, the oath is clean and unperjured which [the accused] 
has sworn.”44 This oath allowed companions (likely the rough equivalent of “co-
defendants”) to apparently swear by each other’s testimony. 
In an analysis of the Dooms, author Sir Frederick Pollock states, “… in Alfred’s 
laws there is mention of a solemn kind of promise called ‘god-borh’; if a suit is brought 
upon it, the plaintiff must make his fore-oath in four churches, and when that has been 
done, the defendant must clear himself in twelve, so that falsehood on either side would 
involve manifold perjury and contempt of the church and the saints.”45 This idea of 
manifold perjury is an attempt to impress upon potential witnesses, the seriousness of 
perjury. Much like the oath attempts to do, swearing in twelve churches seems to 
compound the issue of bearing false witness. Conversely, because the accuser only 
had to swear in four churches, the weight of the accusations fell on the accused to 
swear innocence three times over. 
Later additions to the Dooms included those written by the Grandson of King 
Alfred, King Athelstan of England, who ruled from 924 A.D. to 939 A.D. These provided 
a punishment that was less eternal, while still effecting its purpose: “[a]nd he who shall 
swear a false oath, and it be made clear against him; that he never be oath-worthy, nor 
                                               
43
 Id (author’s note). 
44
 Id (author’s note). 
45
 Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I: Vol. 1, 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010) (1898). 
14 
 
let him lie within a hallowed burial-place, though he die...”46 A change in oath-taking 
appears in this Doom wherein King Athelstan decrees that anyone who lies under oath 
shall not be oath-worthy again. This punishment signals the slow progression that will 
culminate with perjury eventually becoming a common law crime. 
Keeping it all in the family, King Edmund, the half-brother of King Athelstan, 
contributed to the Doom Book as well. He oversaw the addition of what appears to be 
an early “exception” under the law. “Those who swear falsely... let them forever be cast 
out of all commission with God, unless they turn to right repentance.”47 The exception 
here is “right repentance”. What King Edmund I meant by “right repentance”, 
specifically, is unclear. However, here it seems that the prior rule of King Athelstan 
(where a false witness may never again be oath-worthy) comes in direct conflict with 
this idea of repentance under the law. The law is unclear as to what would happen to 
those who did not come to “right repentance” with God. 
 
 
Origin of Perjury 
 
As previously alluded to, the modern idea of perjury as a criminal offense did not 
exist until the mid-sixteenth century. In a pair of articles outlining the advent of Perjury 
as a true Common Law Crime, author Michael D. Gordon explains that the accepted 
thought is 5 Elizabeth c. 9 was the first statute to officially make perjury a crime 
punishable at common law.48 
                                               
46




 Michael D. Gordon, The Perjury Statute of 1563: A Case History of Confusion 439 (Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 1980) (1980). 
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In an attempt to understand why this was the case, the author quotes S.F. 
Milsom, “perjury by witnesses … could not be a common law offence [sic] because 
witnesses had no formal existence.”49 Mr. Gordon explains the phenomenon as a “slow 
evolution of the jury from functioning as witness to functioning as judge…”50 So it 
appears that many forces were at play when the common law crime of perjury was 
created. 
Of the prevalence of perjury during the era, the author quotes Frederick W. 
Maitland, “our ancestors perjured themselves with impunity.”51 This quasi-modern view 
of the crime of perjury shows the necessity for some controls in the courtroom as the 
jury began to gain judicial power. Up until this point it seems that judges were almost 
exclusively the finders of fact and a perjury statute was not seen as necessary because 
the judges saw themselves as fit to determine which testimony to believe. This, in their 
eyes, seemed to be enough of a reason not to enact a formal perjury statute. Once the 
idea of the modern jury was established, a perjury statute was viewed as necessary to 
fill the gap in expertise between jurors and judges. 
Within the same article are two definitions of perjury from the era, each with a 
distinct difference. The first is an Anglo-American criminal definition, “perjury is the 
willful assertion made by a witness in a judicial proceeding upon oath and known to 
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such witness to be false.”52 This definition will become more familiar during this author’s 
discussion of modern perjury statutes.  
The second definition, deemed as being much older, is said to have existed 
before the advent of perjury as a common law crime: “periuria est mendacium cum 
iuramento”53 or rather, “perjury is a lie with an oath.” The distinction here is that the 
thought of lying under oath was always seen as heinous, whereas the crime was a 
totally new concept. 
 
Perjury as a Crime 
 
The evolution of perjury as a common law crime continues into Elizabethan 
Courts where it was given unique treatment. In his analysis, author Michael Gordon 
goes on to describe the punishment, “…when the pillory was abolished as a punishment 
[for crimes generally] in 1816, an exception was made for perjury. This exceptional 
treatment … persisted until 1837.”54 This treatment eventually subsided as a result of a 
particular view. Criminalizing perjury had changed perceptions: “the courts were 
concerned that widespread prosecutions for perjury would make men reluctant to 
testify.”55 
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This opinion was so pervasive at the time that it has leeched into our judicial 
system even today. As evidenced by a case in 160656 where a man was found guilty of 
a number of offenses including perjury, the court declined to try the perjury charge 
because “men are so [slow] to give … for the kinge [sic] and this woulde [sic] [hinder] 
them much more.”57 
As a result, it comes as no surprise that the crime of perjury today is under-
pursued and overly difficult to prove. This is because essentially all of the elements of 
perjury today were developed under the purview of Elizabethan Courts.58 
As the crime of perjury evolved, so did the judicial handling of it. Over time, only 
Common Law Courts were eligible to handle cases of perjury. Specifically precluded 
from handling perjury was the Ecclesiastical Court, or Christian Court.59 This signals yet 
another secularization of the crime of perjury as it moves into the jurisdiction of oaths 
made to man and state, and not to God. A similarly noticeable transition towards state 
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CHAPTER THREE: MODERN HISTORY 
 
As this study shifts from the ancient background of the oath to a more recent 
history, it becomes increasingly necessary to identify the evolution of the oath in 
American law. Specifically, this study shall seek to reveal what past cases can tell us 
about the oath and perjury. 
 
 




The writings of Noah Webster held a unique view of the oath requirement in early 
American Colonial Law. Mr. Webster is best known for his work, “An American 
Dictionary of the English Language”, which would eventually become the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary.60  
Mr. Webster, in examining the oath, states, “[a]n oath created no new obligation. 
A witness, who swears to tell the whole truth, is under no new obligation to tell the 
whole truth. An oath reminds him of his duty; he swears to do as he ought to do that is, 
he adds an express promise to an implied one. A moral obligation is not capable of 
addition or diminution.”61  
The idea that the oath is actually a reminder of one’s duty to tell the truth is a far 
cry from what the Greeks, Romans, and Anglo-Saxons believed the oath to be. Further 
complicating the position of Mr. Webster is the practicality of what he seems to be 
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saying. To believe that a witness’s testimony can be benefitted62 by a simple reminder 
of his or her duty, helps to undermine the purpose of having a perjury statute altogether.  
The stance that a moral obligation is not capable of addition or diminution, on the 
other hand, is extremely helpful in understanding how early Americans might have 
viewed the theological associations that the oath held. 
 
United States Constitution 
 
During the time of the drafting of the United States Constitution, the Nation’s 
founders saw fit to establish a number of provisions that worked to remedy issues they 
had with English rule. Interestingly enough, this two-hundred and thirty-five year old 
document was written with the foresight to include an “Oath or Affirmation” 
requirement.63 This affirmation ability was certainly unorthodox in a period of time that 
was so entrenched with theological underpinnings. Even today, many countries around 
the world retain oath requirements that espouse religious undertones. 
 
Amendments to the Constitution 
 
The Nation’s founders took the handling of religion in the Constitution a step 
further. In the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Establishment Clause 
prohibits any law respecting the establishment of religion.64 The Nation’s founder’s 
foresight is highlighted here in relation to religious preference. 
Why then, does this firm stance against governmental support of one religion 
seem to falter when one enters the courtroom? Why, for hundreds of years, did oaths 
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around the nation contain religious elements despite the edict to separate church and 
state? 
These questions are not easily answered. The most likely reason is that the role 
of a witness was such a solemn position that it transcended religious blockades. It is 
possible that the fear of rampant false testimony was enough to defy this secularization 
for decades. 
The Free Exercise Clause supports this position because it was enacted to limit 
the government’s ability to restrict the free exercise of religion.65 It is the position of this 
author that the religious foundations within the oath survived as a product of 
“conscionable elements” furthered by the Supreme Court of the United States.66 
In the original text of the Constitution of the United States itself, the nation’s 
founders saw it necessary to prevent religious tests from precluding individuals from 
public service. Here they wrote, “[t]he Senators and Representatives before mentioned, 
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial 
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”67 The no religious 
test element in the Constitution bears directly on our topic by further explaining the 
Nation’s founder’s views on religion’s place in the law. 
Another oath appears in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. When outlining searches and seizures, this amendment proscribes that all 
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warrants be sworn to before being signed. It states, “…no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation…”68 This shows an allowance for 
“affirmation” while still attempting to hold individuals responsible for their statements. 
The value of truth is not deemed to be lost by simply choosing to affirm one’s 
statements rather than swear to an oath. 
Finally, an additional lasting impression of the oath in the Fourteenth Amendment 
can be seen, “[n]o person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United 
States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, 
or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof…”69 Here, the Nation’s founders show where the 
oath fits into the Constitutional scheme of things. It becomes clear that someone who 




Whenever American Legal History is evaluated, Supreme Court decisions are 
inevitably a large part of the discussion. Providing the backbone for legal doctrine, the 
Supreme Court makes decisions that affect our daily lives. For the purposes of this 
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study, such decisions can provide the foundation and framework for a clear idea of 
where the oath has been and where it is going.  
In the seminal case U.S. v. Dunnigan, the Court established the parameters of 
the Federal Perjury Statute, “[a] witness testifying under oath or affirmation violates 18 
U.S.C. § 1621 if she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 
intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty 
memory.”70 This precedent builds upon the Federal Perjury Statute. 
It is important to remember that the Court decides issues, including perjury, with 
an obligation to liberty and not its own moral code.71 This avoidance of moral issues 
gives way to an apparent secularization of the Court as evidenced in two cases that 
dealt with witness testimony. 
In Houck v. Florida, the Court established that an unsworn witness is 
incompetent to testify.72 In citing Florida State Statutes, the Court held that “each 
witness shall declare that he will testify truthfully, by taking an oath or affirmation…”73 
Not only is unsworn testimony disallowed per Houck, but it also must not even be 
considered by the Court.74 
In Willis v. Romano, the Court further outlined restrictions on unsworn witness 
testimony. When Appellant, Timothy Willis refused to swear under oath, he actually 
cited a belief in God as his reasoning. He said, “…I believe in the Bible. The Bible says 
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don’t swear by things on Heaven and Earth.”75 In response to his position the Court 
denied Mr. Willis the ability to testify and on appeal the decision was ultimately upheld.76 
Both of these cases disallow the testimony of witnesses who refuse to take the 
oath in some form. The Court showed its leniency by allowing many variants of the oath 
to be taken, so long as the general goal was met: a mental impression of the need for 
truthful testimony.77 
The aforementioned cases help to establish the Court’s belief that the purpose of 
seeking truthful witness testimony is void of religious or theological undertones and is 
now purely the focus of equal justice under the law. This nearly complete abandonment 
of the once pervasive religious undertones that existed in the legal systems of centuries 
past helps put the recommendation of this study into perspective. 
Further examination of the importance of truthful witness testimony (as stated by 
the Supreme Court), yields a case that restricts who can administer the oath. In 
Crockett v. Cassels, the Court limited the administration of the oath to individuals who 
can adequately impress upon the mind of the witness the importance of honest 
testimony.78 Per Crockett, the Court only delineated which individuals may not 
administer an oath, and not who may.79 
The Court seems to move further towards a system of secularization in Torasco 
v. Watkins by striking the provision of the Maryland Constitution that required a belief in 
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God.80 The Court refused to uphold a prior ruling that disallowed an elected 
commissioner from serving unless he professed a belief in God by way of oath.81 This 
decision helped to support the non-religious nature of the oath that is often seen today. 
Despite this fact, religious elements in oaths are still heard around the Country today.82 
If found to be in violation of the oath, one might be subjected to punishment for 
the crime of perjury, as outlined in the case Bronston v. United States. In Bronston, the 
Court established the foundation of the modern perjury statute in the form of specific 
restrictions: statements that are true cannot be perjurious simply on the basis of them 
not responding directly to, or being misleading for the purpose of the question posed.83 
To this end, the Court actually held that “a jury should not be permitted to engage in 
conjecture whether an unresponsive answer… was intended to mislead or divert the 
examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on 
whether [the witness] does believe his answer to be true.”84 This will be expanded upon 
later in the perjury analysis section. 
 
 




The United States Code outlines the crime of perjury as being committed by 
anyone who, “having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in 
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any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,”85 
does certify that “…he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written 
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and 
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not 
believe to be true; or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under 
penalty of perjury … willfully subscribes as true any material matter which he does not 




In Florida, the statute on perjury defines it as the act of making “a false 
statement, which [the witness] does not believe to be true, under oath in an official 
proceeding in regard to any material matter…”88 This statute utilizes the same elements 
as the Federal Perjury Statute, while simply listing them in a distinct way. The 
parallelism here is intentional. 
 
 




The requirement to tell the truth is personified by the oath requirement in Florida. 
“Before testifying, each witness shall declare that he or she will testify truthfully, by 
taking an oath or affirmation in substantially the following form: ‘Do you swear or affirm 
that the evidence you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
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the truth?’”89 This oath requirement, by observation of this author in Orange County 
Court proceedings, is still at times accompanied by the phrase, “So help you God.” 
 
North Dakota’s Oath 
 
The oath requirement in North Dakota states, “[d]o you solemnly swear to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? So help you God.”90 North Dakota 
utilizes the stereotypical oath that many people think of when they try to imagine an 
oath in court. Interestingly, this section of the North Dakota Rules of the Court was 
updated only twelve years ago for the expressed purpose of “…moderniz[ing] the 




In Delaware the oath requirement is written as, “[t]he usual oath in this State shall 
be by swearing upon the Holy Evangels of Almighty God. The person to whom an oath 
is administered shall lay his or her right hand upon the book.”92 While the state of 
Delaware does allow variations on this style of the oath, the message of religious 
preference remains clear. 
The exception in Delaware law states, “[a] person believing in any other than the 
Christian religion, may be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of such person's 
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religion, if there be any such.”93 In this section of Delaware law, concessions are made 




In the Pennsylvania Code of Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, “[e]very witness, 
before giving any testimony shall take an oath in the usual or common form, by laying 
the hand upon an open copy of the Holy Bible, or by lifting up the right hand and 
pronouncing or assenting to the following words: ‘I, A. B., do swear by Almighty God, 
the searcher of all hearts, that I will [testify truthfully], and that as I shall answer to God 
at the last great day.’”94 The Pennsylvania oath seen here is of a much more elaborate 
and theologically influenced style. It should be noted that no apparent exceptions exist 
in Pennsylvania law for the differing styles of the oath, as they do in Delaware. 
With this background and understanding of the limitations of the oath, it becomes 
easier to now analyze what a violation of the oath actually entails. In doing so, the issue 
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“Is the ‘oath or affirmation’ requirement in the Florida Rules of Evidence an 
effective means of ensuring that only the most reliable and truthful testimony is elicited 
in court?” 
The above research most appropriately aides our study in putting into 
perspective the most empirically measurable way of determining if the modern oath or 
affirmation requirement is working. As such, our question can most accurately be 
answered through the creation of a jury instruction that can assist the trier of fact in 
determining if a witness’s testimony is accurate. It is the hope of this author that this jury 
instruction will also serve as an edict to witnesses and attorneys alike, that religious 





It is important to note, before conducting an examination of the available 
evidence and creating this instruction, that the scope of our question is limited only to 
what can be known. This author makes no claim that in all cases, all witness testimony 
can definitively be called true or untrue. In fact, it is generally known that many gray 
areas exist. Further compounding the issue is the nature of cross-examination itself: an 
adversarial process that often uses wording and phraseology to impeach a witness, at 




CHAPTER FIVE: EXAMINATION 
 
En route to creating a jury instruction to supplement the oath or affirmation 
requirement, it becomes vital to understand the prevalence of false testimony and 
perjury in the judicial system. In doing so, an examination of all the evidence available 
for making a determination of what supports and what hinders the most truthful 
testimony is needed. 
During a public address, Dr. Harry Hibschman, LL.D. asserted that in seventy-
five percent of all criminal cases and ninety percent of all domestic disputes, there 
existed instances of perjury.95 This harrowing analysis of perjury in the modern judicial 
system drew a curious response from his audience: laughter.96 It seems that when 
faced with the reality of our current situation, Hibschman’s audience could only respond 
in disbelief, signaling what could be the misperceptions of a much larger population. 
Further muddling the issue is the disconnect between the act of perjury and 
cases of perjury. This can be seen in Dr. Hibschman's works97 as well as recent media 
coverage98. Hibschman explains that in 1922 a study had been conducted to examine 
the instances of perjury in selected states. It showed that in the one hundred and thirty 
years that Kentucky had been a state; the courts had only been called upon to consider 
only eighty-one cases of perjury. Of these cases, only twenty-five were decided against 
the defendant.99 
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Similarly, in the eighty-five years that Michigan had been a state, the courts had 
only heard twenty-four cases of perjury.100 These average out to just over six-tenths of a 
case per year for Kentucky and just under three-tenths of a case per year for Michigan. 
Admittedly, this is not enough to empirically prove any sort of ineffectiveness 
associated with the oath or perjury statutes themselves. Perhaps Kentucky and 
Michigan had inordinately honest populations. But on whole, it was estimated that at the 
time of publication, “not a hundred and fifty persons in the whole United States [were] 
serving sentences for [perjury].”101 Combined with Dr. Hibschman’s previous assertion 
that there exists perjury in seventy-five percent of all criminal cases, this fact yields a 
certain type of inclination. This inclination is further expanded when he delves into the 





“[P]erjurii poena divina, exitium; humana, dedecus.” 




There are four main elements to prove the crime of perjury. In order for the 
elements to be met, it must have proven that the witness was properly sworn in, that the 
statement made was material to the case, that the witness made the statement 
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knowingly and willfully, and that the statement was false.103 In theory, this test may not 
appear to be overwhelmingly difficult to prove. 
However, the difficulty arises in practice. Hibschman says of this, “It is not 
sufficient, for instance, to prove in a given case that the accused on one occasion 
testified one way under oath and on another occasion testified to the exact opposite. 
The state must prove on which occasion [the witness] testified falsely; and it cannot 
make its case by merely proving the conflicting statements under oath.”104 In the same 
vein, he calls perjury one of the most difficult crimes to prove by law and to the 
satisfaction of juries.105 
So difficult it seems, that there is a severe lack of data on instances of perjury. In 
his book, “Tangled Webs”, author James B. Stewart asserts, “[w]e know the precise 
numbers for reported instances of rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, 
and vehicle theft. No one keeps statistics for perjury and false statements... even 
though they are felonies punishable by up to five years in prison. There is simply too 
much of it, and too little is prosecuted to generate any meaningful statistics.”106 
In an article in the Star Tribune, author Heron Marquez interviewed Dakota 
County Attorney James Backstrom. Mr. Backstrom spoke of the prevalence of perjury, “I 
suspect there are far too many instances where individuals lie under oath.”107 In that 
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same article, both Dakota County and Ramsey County staff report that in over 25,000 
cases, only nine have ever resulted in perjury charges.108 
The Florida Supreme Court’s Committee on Standard Jury Instructions (Criminal) 
determined which elements to include in a five-part test for proving perjury. It states, 
“[b]efore [the jury] can find the defendant guilty of Perjury in an Official Proceeding, the 
State must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) [the 
witness] took an oath or otherwise affirmed that [he or she] was obligated by conscience 
or by law to speak the truth in [the proceedings], (2) [t]he oath or affirmation was made 
to [an administer of the oath], (3) [the witness], while under an oath, made the 
statement, (4) [t]he statement was false and (5) [the witness] did not believe the 
statement was true when [he or she] made it.”109 Keep these elements in mind while this 
study frames them into a hypothetical for the purpose of establishing a practical 





Imagine for a moment that you are charged with a Life Felony and that on some 
level you are guilty of what is being charged. In this situation, a number of difficult 
questions would undoubtedly arise, such as the issue of whether or not to testify on 
your own behalf. The American system of Criminal Justice allows for the choice to 
testify on your own behalf or to remain silent. Per the Fifth Amendment right to not self-
incriminate, many defendants opt for the latter for a variety of reasons.  
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Assume, for the sake of this example that you decide to testify on your own 
behalf. You are then posed with the decision central to this study. The decision being, 
whether to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth regarding what 
actually happened. In doing so, a clear cost-benefit analysis arises: do I testify truthfully 
regarding my involvement or do I knowingly violate one (or all) of these three edicts in 
an attempt to avoid incarceration? 
How can this question be answered? The answer is most certainly dependent 
upon who is making the decision and how. Is it a sense of self-preservation guiding the 
decision or is it something else? If the answer is motivated by something more akin to 
an ethical, moral or quasi-religious obligation, it is possibly more likely that the decider 
will feel the need to abide by the oath he or she swore to. It was the opinion of legal 
scholars prior to Common Law, that the witness would be compelled to tell the truth if 
first put under oath. 
But what of the cost-benefit analysis alluded to earlier? Looking at the situation 
purely through this lens provides us with a clearer answer: tell the truth and potentially 
serve a lifetime in prison, or lie and limit the potential exposure to incarceration for 
perjury: a mere five years in prison under Federal Law.110 
Faced with the above example, most understandings of human nature would 
dictate choosing the lesser sentence. Indeed, the American Criminal justice system 
actually encourages this system of thought. Settlements in the civil realm and plea 
bargains in the criminal realm nearly necessitate that a defendant think in terms of 
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potential exposure to incarceration and not in terms of what helps preserve the sanctity 
of our system as it exists today. This can be viewed as a sub-conscious encouragement 
to value self-preservation (in the form of dishonesty under oath) over the integrity of the 
system itself. The connection between the two comes into play when one further 
understands the “Paradox of the Oath”. 
 
 
Paradox of the Oath 
 
It is this counter-intuitive means of decision making that underscores our current 
problem. When posed with a more withdrawn and distant decision; one of whether to 
support the system as a whole or to degrade it for one’s own benefit; there might be a 
different answer, but probably not. This is the “Paradox of the Oath”.  
There exists a paradox because, while witnesses are compelled to tell the truth 
by the oath, the nature of our legal system seems to say differently. In both civil 
settlements and criminal plea bargains, witnesses (primarily defendants) have their 
allegiances torn between the truth and what may be in their best interest. The paradox 
is compounded in criminal court when co-defendants are forced to consider a plea 
bargain that serves their self-preservation needs while simultaneously encouraging 
false testimony, if only on a subconscious level. 
 
 
Florida’s Current Jury Instruction 
 
It is here that a revised use or application of the oath can be helpful. With better 
guidance from our court system, decisions of whether to testify falsely on one’s own 
35 
 
behalf may be lessened. Additionally, if a jury instruction is developed that precludes 
religious undertones; the decision to testify falsely in general may be reduced. Both of 
these options, coupled together, could subtly provide witnesses with less of an incentive 
to testify falsely, while giving the jury a better understanding of its obligation to 
differentiate truth from falsehood. 
The current Jury Instruction in Florida for “Weighing the Evidence” enumerates 
five considerations for jury members to use when determining to believe or disbelieve all 
or any part of the evidence or the testimony of any witness.111 It also lists another five 
considerations to be used as the evidence specific to a case dictates.112 
These considerations or questions are intended to help the jurors evaluate 
witness testimony for truthfulness. They include: “[d]id the witness seem to have an 
opportunity to see and know the things about which the witness testified?”, “[d]id the 
witness seem to have an accurate memory?”, “[w]as the witness honest and 
straightforward in answering the attorneys' questions?”, “[d]id the witness have some 
interest in how the case should be decided?”, and “[d]oes the witness's testimony agree 
with the other testimony and other evidence in the case?”113 These questions are 
certainly helpful in assisting the jury’s evaluation of testimony. They aid in guiding the 
members of the jury to believe testimony that would tend to be more truthful based on 
logic and common sense.  
The additional jury instruction that this thesis proposes will add to this assistance 
by encouraging the jury to disregard any religious preference, or the lack thereof, of any 
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witness thereby eliminating the issues associated with bias by way of theological or 























CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMENDATION 
 
This research into the background of the oath in the courtroom has allowed for a 
deeper understanding of how and why the oath is administered in most courts. It is clear 
which traditions and customs are helpful and which are not. Additionally, this study, if 
reviewed in the light of the Nation’s avoidance of religious preference in court, permits 
the creation of a new addition to the Florida Supreme Court’s Jury Instructions. 
This new instruction should not be construed as enhancing the protection of 
witnesses as much as it is a message to the legal community; that religious preference 
in the form of swearing under oath is not to be used as a benefit or detriment to the 
testimony of witnesses.  
The following statement should be added to the “Final Charge to the Jury” 
instruction, number 3.9, regarding “Weighing the Evidence”, in substantially the 
following manner: 
At the end of the instruction, to add: 
“You should not rely upon any religious preference, or the absence of it, in 
coming to your conclusion about any witness. The fact that a witness agrees or declines 
to swear their oath to God should not be considered in deciding whether to believe or 
disbelieve the testimony of any witness. Elements of the oath that contain religious 
elements are based on tradition and should not be interpreted to mean that a witness is 
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